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WHORF IN THE WILD:  




The past few decades have seen a full resurgence of the question of whether speakers of 
different languages think differently, also known as the Whorfian question. A characteristic 
of this neo-Whorfian enterprise is that the knowledge it has generated stems from 
psycholinguistic laboratory methods. As a consequence, our knowledge about how Whorfian 
effects play out in naturally occurring behaviour (i.e., ‘in the wild’) is severely limited. The 
current study argues that the time is ripe to redeem this evidentiary bias, and advocates a 
multidisciplinary approach towards the Whorfian question, in which insights from laboratory 
settings are combined with naturalistic data in order to yield a rounded picture of the 
influence of language on thought. To showcase the potential of such an approach, the study 
uses laboratory-generated knowledge on the influence of grammatical categories on cognition 
to interpret two examples of naturalistic human interaction and action in the domains of 
spatial navigation and scientific practice.  
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Whorf is back. Big time. The classic question of whether the language we speak influences 
the way we think, typically associated with the work of Benjamin Lee Whorf, has 
experienced a remarkable resurgence over the past few decades. Indeed, since Steven Pinker 
(1994) wrote his so called ‘obituary’ of the Whorfian hypothesis in the early 1990s, hundreds 
of papers, tens of special issues, edited volumes, and monographs have offered an 
overwhelming amount of fascinating evidence lending support to the idea that the linguistic 
categories of our language may indeed point us to observing reality in particular ways (for 
recent overviews, see the collection of articles in Athanasopoulos, Bylund and Casasanto 
2016a).1 However, a common denominator of the demonstrations of Whorfian effects within 
this so-called ‘neo-Whorfian’ movement is that they occur mainly in experimental settings 
using the controlled paradigms afforded by cognitive psychology. Here, ‘behaviour’ or 
‘thought’ is operationalized as some task that typically requires the participant to categorize 
or perceive a given set of stimuli in the laboratory (e.g., objects, colour, motion) on the 
premise that categorization is the cornerstone of human cognition (Harnad 1987). For 
example, Athanasopoulos, Dering, Wiggett, Kuipers and Thierry (2010) recorded brain 
responses in Greek and English speakers while presenting them with green and blue circles, 
and showed that Greek speakers perceived to a greater extent dark/light blue categorical 
contrasts than English speakers did, consistent with Greek colour terminology that encodes 
two categories of blue.  
 As with all lab-generated research, such tasks serve as proxies for the cognitive 
processes that underpin human behaviour outside the lab context. While these data may offer 
important insights into the architecture of the human mind, the fact remains that they are 
inherently artificial and, as a consequence, their ecological validity can be questioned (e.g., 
Hutchins 1995). An inevitable side effect is therefore that it is largely unknown how 
Whorfian effects play out “in the wild”, that is, naturally occurring behaviour outside of the 
laboratory. This state-of-affairs has led several scholars to voice concerns about the 
ecological validity of our current knowledge about the influence of language on thought (e.g., 
Leavitt 2010; McWhorter 2014; Pavlenko 2014; Sidnell and Enfield 2012; Zinken 2012). 
Against this background, the current paper takes a first systematic step towards 
redeeming this epistemological bias. The aim of the paper is to provide a conceptual 
argument for a multidisciplinary approach to linguistic relativity. To achieve this, we first 
bring in naturalistic examples of human interaction and action in the form of illustrative 
vignettes, using as an interpretive lens the knowledge gained from neo-Whorfian laboratory 
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studies, and second, we outline a programme for ecologically valid Whorfian research that 
incrementally moves the field forward by placing multidisciplinarity at its heart. The 
standpoint taken in the paper is that a combination of experimental and naturalistic data is 
likely to yield deeper insights into the effects of language on thought than either may yield in 
isolation.  
The paper is organised in the following way: We start by defining the scope of our 
study and the nomenclature used therein. Next, we present current findings on motion event 
construal, which then serves as the backdrop for our analyses of two naturalistic examples of 
Whorfian effects in human interaction and action. Finally, we provide a programmatic outline 
for an ecologically valid approach to language and thought. 
 
Whorf in the wild: Defining the terms of engagement 
The scope of the paper is circumscribed to engage with the issue of ecological validity 
without entering into the several controversies that surround the Whorfian question (for 
critical discussions see Pinker 1994; Casasanto 2008; McWhorter 2014). This means that, 
first, we will not engage in any discussion as to whether the Whorfian principle is true or 
false. Such binary interpretation is not only counter-productive, but also obsolete in view of 
the growing body of evidence showing that the effects of language on thought are infinitely 
more complex than that (Wolff and Holmes, 2010). Second, we do not claim to hold the truth 
about what Whorf meant in his various formulations of his principle, or how he envisaged its 
empirical realisation, if he did at all. Such claims tend to carry disciplinary bias, may lead to 
strawman argumentation, and have likely caused the controversy associated with the principle 
since its inception (see discussions in Bylund and Athanasopoulos 2014a, Athanasopoulos, 
Bylund and Casasanto 2016b; Casasanto, 2008; Fishman, 1960). Instead, we will assume the 
commonly held view among linguists, anthropologists, and psychologists (e.g., Casasanto 
2008; Duranti 2012; Levinson 2012; Lucy 1992; Regier and Kay 2009; for critical discussion, 
see Jarvis 2016; Pavlenko 2016) that the essence of the Whorfian principle is that our 
understanding and interpretation of the world is influenced by the linguistic categories of the 
language(s) we speak, such that our thoughts and actions are mediated by the lexical and 
grammatical structures made available in our language(s). Put another way, our language 
affects our behaviour, in predictable ways.  
What we need to define, however, is what we mean by ‘in the wild’. Following 
Hutchins (1995), we use the phrase to refer to “naturally occurring culturally constituted 
human activity” (p. xiv). This use is thus different from notions such as “pensée sauvage” 
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(Levi-Strauss 1962) and domesticated mind (Goody and Goody 1977), and instead capitalises 
on the distinction between the laboratory where Whorfian effects are studied in isolation, and 
the everyday world, where Whorfian effects play out in habitual behaviour (Lucy 1992). It is 
in this context therefore important not to equate experiments in the field with behaviour in the 
wild. Whereas the former typically entails applying experimental paradigms in the 
participants’ natural environment, the latter refers to uninhibited and non-elicited behaviour 
(independently of where such behaviour occurs). 
A primitive empirical demonstration of behaviour in the wild was in fact recounted by 
the scholar who coined the term linguistic relativity in the first place, namely Benjamin Lee 
Whorf. Whorf developed the hypothesis by observing behaviour in the wild: industrial 
accidents occurring as a result of people smoking and dropping lit cigarette butts near 
gasoline drums labelled ‘empty’. An empty gasoline drum contains vapours that are highly 
flammable. Yet the verbal label ‘empty’ prompted workers to downplay that potential danger 
in their casual nonverbal behaviour (Whorf 1956b).  
A more recent example comes from Steve Levinson and his study of absolute vs 
relative spatial orientation in speakers of Guugu Yimithirr (GY), an Australian Aboriginal 
language, and Dutch (Levinson 1997; see also Lucy 1992 for brief anecdotes from the 
domain of object categorisation). Dutch and most other Standard Average European speakers 
tend to give and understand directions in an egocentric, relative way: “After the traffic lights, 
take the first right, then the second left, and then you’ll see the super market on your left.” 
But speakers of GY (and many other Polynesian, Native American, and African languages) 
tend to use a system of absolute orientation that relies on fixed geographic directions: “After 
the traffic lights, drive south, and then on the second crossing drive west, and you’ll see the 
super market directly to the north.” One of the most notable anecdotes that Levinson (1997) 
recounts concerns him having difficulty understanding directions given by a GY speaker 
about where to find fish in the local store: 
 
"They have plenty of fish fillet in the store." 
"I've never seen it; where?" 
"On this side" [gesturing] "in the frozen food container, far end this side." 
 
Levinson reports that he and his GY interlocutor were standing in a hospital 45 kilometres 
from the said store. Levinson was expected to observe that the gesture of his interlocutor was 
to the northeast, so that next time he was in the store he would look in the northeast corner. 
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This naturalistic interaction suggests that habitual ways of talking about space have 
consequences for understanding location and direction during talk-in-interaction and 
behaviour in the wild.  
 
Motion events in language and cognition 
We have chosen to showcase naturalistic Whorfian effects in the domain of motion, given its 
centrality in human everyday life. The encoding of motion in language and cognition is a 
major area of investigation within neo-Whorfian research in general (e.g., Pederson and 
Bohnemeyer 2010), and more recently applied linguistics (e.g., Bylund and Athanasopoulos 
2015a). It has been demonstrated that speakers of different languages attend differently to the 
goal, or endpoint, of motion. For instance, imagine two people walking along a road at the 
end of which there is a church. If you speak a language that encodes the aspectual distinction 
of imperfectivity (and its subcategories, e.g., the progressive2) on an obligatory scale 
(labelled ‘aspect languages’ in this literature, e.g., English, Algerian Arabic, Russian, 
Spanish), you are prone to ‘zoom in’ on the motion itself and the path along which it occurs, 
whereas if you are a speaker of a language that lacks this grammatical distinction (i.e., ‘non-
aspect languages’, e.g., Afrikaans, German, Swedish) you are more likely to zoom out’ and 
include the motion endpoint in your construal (Athanasopoulos and Bylund 2013; Bylund 
2008, 2011; Bylund & Athanasopoulos 2014b; Bylund, Athanasopoulos and Oostendorp 
2013; Flecken, von Stutterheim and Carroll 2014; von Stutterheim and Nüse 2003; von 
Stutterheim et al. 2012). This is presumably because speakers of aspect languages encode the 
ongoing phase of events on a habitual basis (through obligatory marking of imperfective 
aspect), thereby excluding its endpoints, whereas speakers of non-aspect languages instead 
construe events from a holistic perspective. 
 This zooming in and out of temporal frames has been operationalised in a number of 
different ways in the lab. For the elicitation of verbal behaviour, speakers are typically asked 
to describe a set of specially designed videos showing motion towards an endpoint/goal, but 
the video ends before the endpoint is reached. Such retelling tasks may also be combined 
with online methods such as eye-tracking. Findings from these paradigms show that speakers 
of aspect languages are less likely to mention and look at the (potential) endpoint of a given 
motion event than speakers of non-aspect languages (e.g., von Stutterheim et al. 2012). For 
the elicitation of non-verbal behaviour (i.e., outside of the speech act), a commonly used 
technique is the so-called triads-matching (Lucy 1992), or ABX task, where the participant is 
shown a stimulus triad: video A, which depicts motion with a reached endpoint (“high 
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endpoint alternate”); video B, which depicts motion without any discernible endpoint (“low 
endpoint alternate”); and video X, which depicts motion with a potential (but not reached) 
endpoint (“intermediate”). This is a forced-choice task, and the participant has to decide 
whether video A or B is most similar to video X (the order of videos A and B is 
counterbalanced). Findings here show that speakers of aspect languages tend to judge the low 
endpoint alternate video as more similar to X, compared to speakers of non-aspect languages 
who show the reverse pattern (e.g., Athanasopoulos and Bylund 2013; Athanasopoulos et al. 
2015; Bylund & Athanasopoulos 2014b, 2015b).  
 
Naturalistic Examples of Whorfian Effects in the Domain of Motion 
We use two examples of naturalistic interaction and action, presented as vignettes, to 
illustrate how cross-linguistic differences in the conceptualisation of motion influences 
everyday behaviour and scientific thinking. Example 1 illustrates a communication 
breakdown arising from language-specific interpretations of directions. Example 2 provides a 
demonstration of how researchers’ native languages can bias experimental design in the very 
same domain, namely cross-linguistic differences in motion cognition. 
 
Example 1: At the Duke’s Estate 
Sociocultural approaches to first language (L1) and second language (L2) development 
(Kramsch, 2004; Lantolf and Thorne, 2007; Lucy and Wertsch, 1987; Vygotsky, 1987) 
consider language as one of the key mediators of human mental functioning and a primary 
instrument of socialization and acculturation. Therefore, such approaches have the potential 
to readily expand the scope of the Whorfian endeavour to a more ecologically valid empirical 
realm by investigating the effects of language on social interaction. An empirical example of 
how this can be achieved is provided by Sidnell and Enfield (2012). The authors focused on 
how epistemic authority (defined as “the action of agreeing with what someone has just said 
while simultaneously signalling that one has greater authority to have said it” (p. 304) is 
asserted in talk-in-interaction across different sociocultural contexts. By analysing the 
assertion of epistemic authority in spontaneous conversations across a number of languages, 
they show that the conversational devices used for this purpose lead, in some linguistic 
contexts (e.g. Caribbean English Creole) to topic dropping, and in others (e.g. Finnish) to 
topic expanding.3 The finding is novel and striking: different ways of actualizing the same 
communicative goal shape the ongoing interaction in different directions. Sidnell and 
Enfield’s (2012) approach focuses on the effects of conversational devices on talk-in-
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interaction. However, the potential is there to study talk-in-interaction effects of grammatical 
categories beyond just the verbal level (as proposed by Duranti 2012 and Lucy 2016), as the 
following example illustrates. 
 
Example and analysis4   
Several years ago, we were engaged in a collaborative research project the aim of which was 
to ferret out whether crosslinguistic differences in grammatical aspect encoding influences 
thinking about motion events beyond speech production. The reported incident occurred 
while we were working on this project. It took place during a walk in the English countryside, 
following a footpath connecting a town with a small village. The walk proceeds through a 
private Estate owned by an English Duke, who has allowed access to the footpath for the 
public. There is no other way to get from the town to the village on foot except than to go 
along the public footpath that cuts through the Duke’s Estate. The footpath ends just outside 
the final approach to the village, upon which one must cross a large field to reach the village. 
The first village building visible on that side is the village church and cemetery (see Figure 
1). However, it is not uncommon for people to walk towards another footpath parallel to the 
large field and try to reach the village through a gated entrance. In doing so, they would be 
unknowingly trespassing on private property, namely the Duke’s Estate. There are no 
prominent signs to warn people off. Instead, unaware trespassers are addressed via an 
intercom system controlled by a security guard who can also receive video images through 
CCTV. Oblivious trespassing of this kind must occur frequently, because the advice given is 
almost always the same formulaic instruction (or some slight variant thereof): “To get out of 
the Duke’s estate, walk across the field diagonally”. This level of granularity to describe the 
required motion in the scenery depicted in Figure 1 is apparently enough for English speaking 
interlocutors to understand what it is they need to do. But when a multilingual group of 
friends (including the authors of this paper) decided to take this walk, this set of instructions 
caused confusion for some of them. 
 Specifically, two of our friends, a Spaniard and a German, had walked ahead of the 
rest of the group, and had made the classic trespassing error that any newcomer to the village 
makes, described above. As we observed this from a distance, we rushed to warn them to take 
a different path. As soon as we reached them, we heard the familiar instructions over the 
intercom. The exchange proceeded as follows:  
 




The Spaniard promptly begins to walk, while the German remains in situ, appearing hesitant 
(perhaps confused). Then the Spaniard points to the path across the field (at the end of which 
there is a church, see Figure 1). After a few moments of careful visual examination and 
consideration of the scene the German says: 
 
”Ah, so you mean we should walk towards the church?” 
 




[FIGURE 1 HERE] 
 
Two rich points5 can be identified in this exchange, concerning the endpoint of the action (the 
church) vs. the action itself (walk across the field diagonally). Our Spanish friend seemed 
perfectly content with the English speaking guard’s instructions, and his subsequent action 
indicated that he understood them without hesitation. Our German friend, however, did not 
take immediate action, and this presents the first rich point in the interaction. Now clearly, 
since she is a very advanced speaker of English, this cannot have been because she failed to 
understand the semantic content of the instructions. Her body language, looking at the field 
and trying to work out how to map what she heard with the affordances the visual scene 
presented her with, indicated that at a pragmatic level she was assuming that the guard was 
being cooperative, and she was trying to be cooperative herself: Indeed, her request for 
clarification in the form of an attempt to recast the instructions indexed her willingness to 
follow the guard’s expressed intention. The problem, in more precise terms, was one of 
mutual manifestness (Sperber and Wilson, 1995), defined as follows: “A fact is manifest to 
an individual at a given time if and only if he is capable of representing it mentally and 
accepting its representation as true or probably true” (Sperber and Wilson, 1995: 39). Mutual 
manifestness is a product of the moment and thus distinct from mutual knowledge between 
speaker and addressee: no prior assumptions about the context of the exchange are required 
for interpretation. Rather, the addressee constructs these assumptions based “on what he can 
perceive in his immediate physical environment, or on the basis of assumptions already 
stored in memory” (Pilkington, 2000: 62).  
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 As we mentioned earlier, Spanish and English are aspect languages that zoom in on 
the ongoingness of an event, excluding its endpoints, whereas German is a non-aspect 
language, with a holistic event construal that includes endpoints.6 So one logical assumption 
that follows is that for the German speaking addressee in our example above to be able to 
mentally represent the security guard’s instructions, she had to inspect the immediate 
physical environment and reconstruct the directions in a way that conformed to assumptions 
already stored in memory, namely the tendency in her native language to structure 
information involving motion in a way that includes the goals or endpoints of said motion. 
Visually searching for an endpoint in this naturalistic setting represents a real-life instance of 
a phenomenon observed in speakers of non-aspect languages in the laboratory with eye-
tracking. Similarly, the Spaniard’s immediate shift of attention to the path of the suggested 
action mirrors the immediate allocation of attention to motion paths in speakers of aspect 
languages (Flecken et al., 2015).  
 Recasting the same directions in the form of a goal-directed action (walk towards the 
church) may have enabled the German speaker to confirm, or manifest, the veracity of the 
directions, but it also led to the second rich point in the exchange, where the Spanish speaker 
initially hesitated in his confirmation of his German friend’s statement. The pause in-between 
occurred because our Spaniard friend literally looked up into the horizon to verify that there 
was indeed a church at the end of the path described by the security guard. Again, this seems 
to not only align with the definition of mutual manifestness and its manifestation in the first 
rich point, but also points to typological differences in conceptualization and information 
structure between Spanish and English on the one hand, and German on the other, as the 
likely cause of the rich points. Indeed, the Spaniard’s native language, as well as the language 
of interaction, are both aspect languages and laboratory findings show that the use of multiple 
aspect languages exacerbates the defocusing of motion endpoints (Bylund and 
Athanasopoulos 2014b). 
To assess the accuracy of our interpretation that these communication near-
breakdowns (and subsequent repairs) were indeed caused by differences in endpoint focus 
(and not some hitherto unknown cultural difference between speakers and addressees, or any 
other contextual variable unaccounted for), we ran our analysis by the interlocutors, as means 
of member checking. The Spaniard confirmed that he indeed had not noticed the church until 
pointed to it by the German, but instead had understood that by simply following the path 
they would find their way out. The German, in contrast, pointed out that to her the 
instructions had seemed to lack a clear sense of direction since it was not mentioned whereto 
10 
 
they were supposed to be heading. As a result, she first hesitated and then made the 
connection with the church as the implicit ‘whereto’. Indeed, experimental findings show that 
German speakers tend to construe a potential endpoint even when one is not visibly present 
(von Stutterheim 2003). Both speakers also confirmed that they had had no problems in 





The exchange described above provides an illustrative example of the way in which 
grammatical categories can influence behaviour during talk-in-interaction. Had the exchange 
been studied without the knowledge of crosslinguistic differences in endpoint encoding, it 
would have been challenging to grasp the breakdown and repair in all their richness. It could 
of course have been hypothesised that these events occurred because the speakers seemed to 
differ in their goal-orientation, as this is a possible reading of the exchange even without 
insights into neo-Whorfian research on endpoint encoding. However, in that case it would 
still be difficult to pinpoint what underlies such differences.  
 Adopting the well-documented laboratory effects of grammatical aspect on motion 
event cognition as an interpretative frame of the exchange instead offers several advantages. 
Firstly, it has a firm empirical ground in numerous independent studies confirming linguistic 
structure as the main cause of endpoint encoding behaviour. Second, it offers a nuanced 
understanding of the nature of this behaviour, showing that while behaviour in the lab is 
easily malleable by experimentally manipulating the language context of operation 
(Athanasopoulos et al. 2015), behaviour in the wild may not always be as malleable. 
Specifically, even though the German interlocutor was operating in an aspect language 
context (English), and the conversational context involved two speakers of aspect languages 
(the security guard, and her Spanish friend), her interpretation of directions was still 
ostensibly influenced by her native language (for further evidence of L1-induced patterns of 
event construal in L2 speakers, see Athanasopoulos, Damjanovic, Burnand and Bylund 2015, 
Bylund and Athanasopoulos 2015b; Donoso and Bylund 2014; Flecken, Carroll, Weimar and 
von Stutterheim 2015). Indeed, as she reported to us, the situation she found herself in 
induced a certain degree of stress (having trespassed and trying to understand the guard’s 
directions). This, in turn, may have prompted a more L1-derived endpoint orientation, since it 
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is well-documented that affective neural pathways are more strongly connected to the L1 than 
to the L2 (Harris et al., 2003).  
Alternative explanations of the breakdown and repair may take into account cognitive 
sex-differences, namely that the female brain excels in verbal tasks whereas the male brain is 
better adapted to visual-spatial tasks (e.g. Joseph, 2000). Such explanation could be 
compatible with the first part of the exchange: one could attribute the German speaker’s 
(female) confusion to a combination of less emphasis on visuospatial traits in favour of 
enhanced verbal skills, which are more likely to trigger reliance on language-specific 
cognitive structures. Similarly, one could attribute the Spanish speaker’s (male) quick 
understanding of the guard’s instructions as typical of his enhanced visuospatial skills. But 
such an account would leave half the data unexplained. The second part of the exchange, and 
our subsequent member checking, confirmed that the German speaker emphasised 
visuospatial traits of the scene (the church-endpoint) not attended to by the Spanish speaker. 
Hence alleged cognitive sex differences in enhanced visuospatial skills cannot adequately 
account for the data. While we cannot claim that the Whorfian explanation is the only 
plausible explanation (no doubt many other personal history variables may be at play), it 
nonetheless remains the least implausible explanation for the communication near-
breakdowns observed here, and is in fact compatible with socio-cultural evidence that, all 
other things being equal, there are minimal differences in verbalisation susceptibility between 
men and women (Cameron 2009). We believe that without knowledge of the typological 
differences between German and Spanish, and the rich laboratory evidence showing 
differences in how German and Spanish speakers verbalise and cognitively process events, 
interpretation of such cross-cultural exchanges would be left to endless speculation and 
debate. Essentialistic interpretations are thus more easily avoided when the linguistic and 
cognitive complexity of multilingual behaviour is known. 
 In summary, the example illustrates a unique instance of how crosslinguistic cognitive 
differences may shape the ongoing behaviour and interaction between interlocutors. To the 
best of our knowledge, links between language and cognition at this level of specificity are 
seldom made when observing behaviour in the wild.  
 
Example 2: In the Laboratory 
Background 
The event in Example 1 suggests Whorfian effects in the wild, actualised in the moment of 
communication. However, behaviour in the wild also entails actions that are realised over a 
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longer time-frame, such as actions and behaviour arising from collaborative activities towards 
a common goal (Hutchins 1995). Example 2 illustrates this, focusing on the domain of 
scientific practice. 
 The role that language plays in the scientific enterprise is a classic topic that has been 
discussed for centuries -- or even millennia -- in a variety of different disciplines (e.g., 
Bennett and Hacker 2003; Bourdieu 2004; Harris 1980). A famous example is the debate 
between physicists Niels Bohr and Albert Einstein over quantum mechanics, which Bohr 
himself interpreted as resulting from divergent understandings of certain concepts, leading 
him to contend that “[w]e are suspended in language in such a way that we cannot say what is 
up and what is down” (cited in Petersen 1963: 10). As in the Bohr-Einstein case, a major part 
of the debate and inquiry on language and science has concerned whether terminology 
induces preconceived ideas about the phenomenon it refers to, and thus whether scientific 
thought can ever be put into words without becoming ‘tainted’. Actually, an example of this 
may be found in the trajectory of nascent empirical approaches to linguistic relativity. Leavitt 
(2011), in his historical treatise of the Whorfian idea complex, made the point that once what 
Whorf referred to as the ‘principle’ of linguistic relativity was turned into a ‘hypothesis’ (cf. 
Brown and Lenneberg 1953) there was a shift in the evidentiary basis towards hypothesis-
testing paradigms emanating from the cognitive psychology laboratory. 
Whorf’s approach to the role of language in science sought to move beyond 
nomenclature alone, attempting to understand how crosslinguistic differences in 
categorisation influenced the scientific enterprise. This idea was later echoed by Fishman 
(1960), and potential examples of such instances are found in the study of colour perception 
where allegedly universal colour categories were modelled on English colour terms (e.g., 
Berlin and Kay, 1969) (for further discussion, see Pavlenko 2014; Wierzbicka, 2008). So far, 
however, few attempts have been made to pinpoint the role that language-specific 
categorisation patterns plays in the actual research process itself. The event described below 
constitutes one such example. 
 
Example and analysis 
When we started collaborating on our motion event project several years ago, we decided to 
use a triads-matching task, given its widespread use in neo-Whorfian research. As described 
in the section ‘motion events in language and cognition’, this is a similarity judgement task 
where the participant has to decide whether a target event X is more similar to alternate A or 
B. The stimuli had been made available to us by Christiane von Stutterheim’s team at 
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Heidelberg University. A crucial step in the design was to classify them into three different 




The process of categorising the clips into these different categories is as central as it is 
sensitive: inappropriate classifications may produce biases or inconsistencies in the stimulus 
set, which, in the end, will yield unreliable experimental data. Having selected a subset of 47 
clips (based on their common characteristics, e.g., number of participants, motion type, and 
scenery) out of a pool of over a 100, we proceeded to classify these clips according to Table 
1. Given the centrality of this step in the design process, as well as practical issues (e.g., 
working in different countries), we decided to first do the classifications independently of one 
another, and then compare our lists. To our surprise, our lists were quite different and it 
turned out rather difficult to agree how the clips should actually be classified. We have 
assessed the inter-rater reliability of our classifications. For the subset of clips as a whole, our 
agreement reached 72.3%, which is just below the commonly recommended 75%. As 
indicated by Cohen’s kappa, this agreement was ‘moderate’, κ = .59. A closer look at our 
classifications reveals that the disagreements varied as a function of endpoint orientation 
category. For candidates to the category “high degree of endpoint orientation”, 81.8% (κ = 
.67) of our classifications aligned. In contrast, the classifications of candidates to the 
“intermediate degree” and “low degree” categories showed poor conformity, only 55.6% (κ = 
.05) and 47.8% (κ = .05), respectively, suggesting that agreement was at chance level. The 
low incidence of conformity here arose from the fact that clips that the first author (P.A.) 
tended to classify as “intermediate degree”, were classified as “low degree” by the second 
author (E.B.). 
 
[FIGURE 2A, B, C HERE] 
 
 An example of a clip that triggered heated debate amongst us is shown in stills in 
Figure 2A, 2B, 2C. Here, E.B. would argue that, beyond any doubt, the house is clearly 
visible, and the fact that it is at the end of the path along which the women are walking makes 
it a given candidate for the endpoint of the motion: as such, the clip should be categorised as 
“intermediate degree”. This endpoint-based interpretation of the clip corresponds to a holistic 
viewing frame, in which the agents in motion (the women) and the endpoint (the house) 
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(Figure 3A) are included. P.A., on the other hand, would argue that even though the house 
might be visible, the clip depicted two women out for a walk, and to interpret the house as 
being the endpoint of the motion was a leap of imagination: therefore, the clip should be 
categorised as “low degree”. This interpretation with emphasis on ongoingness, in turn, is 
consistent with an immediate viewing frame, zooming in on the motion and excluding the 
endpoint (Figure 3B). 
 
[FIGURE 3A, B, C] 
 
 As disagreements and exchanges of this type arose throughout the classification 
process it started to dawn upon us that they may actually be reflections of the very thing we 
sought to test with our experiment: the effects of language on thought. There are several 
factors providing support for this interpretation. During this phase of the research preparation 
process, E.B. was working in Sweden and, while being proficient in the aspect languages 
English and Spanish, he used his native non-aspect language Swedish as primary means of 
communication.7 Swedish has no grammatical category to mark imperfective aspect. P.A., on 
the other hand, who is a native speaker of Greek8, had by then been studying and working in 
the UK for over 10 years. P.A.’s primary languages of communication, English and Greek, 
were languages that obligatorily mark imperfective aspect. In other words, the degree to 
which our classifications differed was largely isomorphic to the crosslinguistic differences 
that the experiment yielded later on. Moreover, our strong agreement on the high-endpoint 
alternates is perfectly aligned with robust findings that the crossing of a boundary (into a 
house, out of a house) is perceptually salient and may override language-induced 
categorisation biases (Athanasopoulos & Bylund 2013; Regier and Zheng 2007; Slobin 
1996). 
Even though, before carrying out the classifications, we had made sure that the three 
categories of endpoint orientation were carefully defined, the classification bias may have 
started already at the time the different categories were created, such that, for instance, the 
label ‘medium degree of endpoint orientation’ invoked different pictures in our minds as to 
what an exemplar of this category should look like. The bias was later exacerbated by our 
different conceptualisations of the clips themselves9. 
 It could possibly be argued, though, that these differences in endpoint classification 
preferences were autosuggested, stemming from a desire to believe that grammatical aspect 
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does influence cognition - a fair share of subjective beliefs is indeed found in the history of 
linguistic relativity research (Pinker 1994; Pullum 1988) - and then behaving accordingly. 
However, there are reasons to believe this was not the case. When embarking on the research 
project, we had both felt very sceptical as to whether crosslinguistic differences in endpoint 
descriptions would really influence higher order cognitive processing, since contemporary 
research on other types of motion events (focusing on path and manner) had reported minimal 
- if any - crosslinguistic differences (e.g., Papafragou et al. 2002). Thus, obtaining a null 
result in this new area of motion cognition (goal-orientation and grammatical aspect) would 
have been perfectly in line with previous findings, providing compelling evidence that 
cognitive processing in the general motion domain is subject to universal-perceptual 
principles rather than linguistic categories.10 
 
Implications 
The event described constitutes a seldom documented, detailed example of the effects of 
linguistic categories (i.e., beyond pure terminology) on scientific practice.  
 The example further highlights two additional aspects of this problem. First, it shows 
that simply having knowledge of another language does not create immunity against 
linguistic bias in scientific practice. Even though E.B. was a proficient L2 speaker of two 
aspect languages, his classifications were still very consistent with the linguistic context in 
which they had been carried out. It is of course possible that a monolingual speaker of 
Swedish could have exhibited an even stronger endpoint-preference, but studies show that 
language context of operation is a strong determinant of behaviour in the laboratory as well, 
even in advanced L2 speakers (Athanasopoulos et al. 2015; Bylund and Athanasopoulos 
2017). This example illustrates that L2 knowledge, in and of itself, is not a prophylactic 
against native language induced biases. This resonates with Pavlenko’s (2014) belief that 
making bilingualism an academic requirement would not automatically eliminate the risks 
that academics still rely on their native or dominant language in their research endeavour.  
 However, something that may actually reduce such risks is working with multilingual 
and multicultural research teams that can bring multicompetent perspectives (Cook and Li 
Wei 2016). The advantage of such research teams has been highlighted in the context of 
ethnographic research (e.g., Creese, Takhi and Blackledge 2016; Martin 2012), but the 
constellation is yet to be recognised as a standard methodological requirement in linguistic 
relativity research. The consequences of monolingual teams are potentially far-reaching: Had 
the team members in the example above shared native language, it would have increased the 
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risk of biasing the selection of videoclips, which ultimately could have skewed the results in 
unpredictable ways. Instead, in the current case, each member brought his own language-
specific perspective of the meaning of endpoint-orientation to the research task at hand, and 
then, through a process of negotiation, the final set of experimental stimuli was co-
constructed11. 
 Another important aspect of Example II is the reflexive relationship it illustrates: the 
influence of language on thought in research on the influence of language on thought (see 
also Silverstein 1979). The attested effect should however not come as a surprise. If 
language-specific categories may indeed influence our thinking, why should scientific 
thinking be exempt from this influence? To think that it is, would be consistent with the 
controversial view of the scientific mind as detached, obeying only the laws of logic, immune 
to any experiential factors (such as language background, ethnicity, gender, etc.) (for further 
discussion see the correspondence between Kay and Kuehni (2008) and Wierzbicka (2008)). 
 
Towards a Wilder Whorf 
The vignettes presented above serve to illustrate the potential of bringing together different 
data types for gaining a fuller picture of the influence of language on thought. We believe 
that the development of this enterprise toward a workable research programme will be best 
served by a closer disciplinary alliance than currently exists between lab-generated research 
and ethnographic methods of recording behaviour in the wild. In essence, we argue that the 
optimal way forward is multidisciplinarity. There is a wealth of studies within linguistic 
anthropology positing that behavioural patterns are upheld through, or mediated by, linguistic 
patterns, drawing on long-term solid ethnographic evidence (e.g., Duranti 1994; Hanks 1991). 
In the enterprise we envisage, such evidence is combined with controlled experiments that 
allow the researcher to establish a direct link (or even causality) between linguistic categories 
and behaviour.  
More specifically, we propose a tripartite evidentiary cycle towards a more nuanced 
and rounded understanding of Whorfian effects, as per Figure 4, based on the following three 
components: 1) Typology, broadly defined as language usage patterns, including (but not 
limited to) lexicogrammatical categories, information structure (i.e. what the speaker chooses 
to encode, and how they phrase it), and conversational devices; 2) the Lab refers to behaviour 
elicited through controlled experiments; 3) the Wild refers to natural behaviour occurring in 
natural surroundings. These components are interlinked in distinct ways: Typology may 
generate hypotheses to be tested both in the lab and in the wild. Evidence from the wild may 
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also be (re)interpreted against typology, as our examples illustrate (hence the bidirectionality 
of arrow B), but this is unlikely to be the case for experimental evidence, as experiments are 
designed to test hypotheses derived from typology (hence the unidirectionality of arrow C). A 
bidirectional relationship also exists between the wild and the lab (arrow A). Crucially, there 
need not be a hierarchical or chronological relationship between naturalistic and laboratory 
data. The one data type is neither necessarily superior to the other, nor must it be obtained 
before the other. Sometimes observations of naturalistic behaviour precedes - and triggers - 
laboratory studies (e.g., Levinson 1997), other times naturalistic behaviour may be 
interpreted or reinterpreted through knowledge gained from the lab (as in Example 1). 
Ideally, one type would corroborate the other. If the ethnographer observes cultural practices 
that she interprets as stemming from specific linguistic devices, and then finds that lab studies 
also show the effects of such linguistic devices in controlled experimentation, then she may 
point to that evidence as indeed substantiating her interpretation. Conversely, if the 
psycholinguist’s experiment yields a finding that shows the effect of a specific grammatical 
category on behaviour, and then finds that ethnographic work attributes similar behaviours in 
the wild to the same grammatical category, the psycholinguist can then point to that evidence 
as strengthening their lab finding. Equally useful would be instances where behaviour from 
the lab and from the wild are discordant, because this generates new impetus for the 
researcher to investigate the root of the discordancy and shed further light on factors affecting 




We are aware that the practicalities of a multidisciplinary approach may seem 
daunting, as it would require a researcher who is trained in both linguistic ethnography and 
experimental methods, and a sufficient amount of observation and long-term participation in 
the community being observed. However, similar to the case made for multilingual research 
teams earlier in the paper, we suggest that multidisciplinary research teams, comprised by for 
instance linguists, anthropologists, and psychologists, would hold the greatest of promise for 
undertaking the endeavour outlined in figure 4. Building up such teams and methodological 
expertise may be a lengthy process, but one that we believe is achievable, if providing a more 
rounded picture of the Whorfian question is the aim. 
There are however smaller steps that can be taken in the interim. If we now imagine 
that arrow A is a continuum representing human behaviour, one end of which is the wild, the 
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other end being the lab, then we can generate fertile empirical ground for methodological 
practices that are situated at various points within this continuum. The evidentiary harvest 
may reveal aspects of behaviour that corroborate or reveal something novel that could not 
have been observed by adhering to strict disciplinary methodological principles. Below we 
offer suggestions towards this end.   
Anecdotes from the lab: An easy way to start is for psycholinguists to report on 
participants’ behaviour that is not the specific targeted dependent variable of the experiment, 
but still provides relevant information. For instance, in our own experiments on motion event 
description (where the dependent variable is ‘endpoint mentioned/omitted), we have noticed 
that speakers of non-aspect languages remark that the descriptions are difficult to carry out 
because it is not always obvious whereto people are going. Such anecdotal evidence would 
serve as corroborating evidence, but could also potentially reveal hitherto unknown aspects of 
behaviour that could serve as pivots for further research (see also Lucy 2004 for similar 
anecdotal reports during his experiments). 
Take the lab to the wild: This step entails designing experimental tasks that are in fact 
suited to behaviour in the wild in the first place. An example of this is Levinson’s (1997) 
extension of the spatial cognition research, where participants were asked to follow and 
interpret directions outdoors. In addition, owing to fast technological developments, modern 
day psycholinguistic equipment is more mobile than it used to be, and thus less constrained to 
a specific physical space. An obvious way to take the lab to the wild is then to make use of 
instruments that record attention allocation (i.e., eye-tracking), galvanic skin response, heart 
rate, etc. These techniques are already used ‘in the wild’ in other fields (e.g., consumer 
behaviour research, Gidlöf, Wallin, Dewhurst and Holmqvist 2013), suggesting there is 
potential utilising these techniques in Whorfian research. All the above suggestions of course 
entail that the observer is a conscious participant of the study, but they would record or elicit 
behaviour in a naturalistic environment without artificial or proxy representation of reality 
constrained by the visual affordances of a lab computer screen. 
Take the wild to the lab: In the lab, because experimental control is key, tasks are 
often designed to tap a specific cognitive or perceptual process. However, in real life, as 
becomes evident in the examples, relativistic effects may manifest themselves in a range of 
different mental operations, all occurring at the same time or in close connection. Our 
accumulated knowledge about relativistic effects is now such, at least in some perceptual 
domains, that we can move beyond the traditional categorisation tasks and start looking at 
more interactive tasks inside the laboratory, using more ecologically valid stimuli where 
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possible. For example, Pavlenko et al. (2017) elicited verbal descriptions of real paintings 
containing various hues and shades of blue in Russian speakers through semi-structured 
interviews, without using the standardized colour charts (e.g., Munsell) used typically in 
colour research. If we wanted to extend this research to the wild, we could envisage a non-
verbal colour task that would for example ask participants to colour in a picture using a set of 
paints, the availability of which is manipulated in such a way that tests the salience of the 
colour categories of interest in the painter’s mind. In a similar vein, immersive virtual reality 
laboratory paradigms can be developed to emulate, as much as possible, naturalistic settings 
(see Casasanto & Jasmin 2017). 
 
Concluding remarks 
The aim of this paper was to systematically engage with the Whorfian hypothesis in a more 
ecologically valid way. To this end, we first used insights generated from neo-Whorfian 
laboratory studies to analyse two examples of Whorfian behaviour in the wild, and then 
proceeded to articulate a programmatic outline for future research endeavours. The vignettes 
presented in the paper clearly illustrate the potential of different data types for gaining a fuller 
picture of the influence of language on thought. Indeed, as pointed out in the introduction, it 
was by observing such real life examples of (mis)understanding that inspired Whorf himself 
to come up with the linguistic relativity hypothesis. Whorf likened the ubiquitous nature of 
effects of language on thinking to the unconscious nature of our background experience 
informing our worldview: 
 
“…if a rule has absolutely no exceptions, it is not recognized as a rule or as anything else; it 
is then part of the background of experience of which we tend to remain unconscious. Never 
having experienced anything in contrast to it, we cannot isolate it and formulate it as a rule 
until we so enlarge our experience and expand our base of reference that we encounter an 
interruption of its regularity. The situation is somewhat analogous to that of not missing the 
water till the well runs dry, or not realizing that we need air till we are choking.” (Whorf, 
1956, p. 209). 
 
Interpreting a scene or a social action through the lens of language is an unconscious process. 
The intersubjectivity issues and subsequent repairs described in both of our examples can be 
precisely viewed as instances of this ‘interruption of regularity’ that Whorf describes in the 
above extract. We can create and control this interruption of regularity in the psycholinguist’s 
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laboratory, or observe and analyse it using the ethnographer’s toolkit. As the phenomenon 
studied is the same, there seems to be no reason why a more holistic methodological 
approach should not be adopted.  
Our examples demonstrate that it is indeed possible to show effects of linguistic 
categories beyond just the laboratory, documenting behaviours in the wild that may be rooted 
in the intricately diverse grammatical and lexical systems that typically form the basis de 
rigueur of traditional Whorfian and neo-Whorfian approaches. We propose that a 
multidisciplinary approach would offer the much needed missing link between the neo-
Whorfian movement and naturalistic behaviour that has eluded Whorfian studies to date. In 
our experience, the topic of linguistic relativity, or language and thought in general, tends to 
spark considerable interest among students, laypeople, and journalists. However, when 
people hear about the methodologies used in neo-Whorfian research, their interest either 
fades because of the apparent artificial nature of the experiments, or it sparks unwarranted 
cross-cultural generalisations that lack the firm basis in linguistic typology and the nuance 
provided by experimental methods. In the absence of naturalistic data, our knowledge about 
Whorfian effects outside of the laboratory will remain speculative, at best. Likewise, as long 
as experimental data are lacking, our knowledge about the effects of a given linguistic 
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research focus” (http://www.ethknoworks.com/blog.htm?post=715651) 
6 Spanish has an obligatory distinction in the past tense between perfective and imperfective aspect, and a semi-
optional distinction between progressive aspect and non-progressive aspect in the present and the past tenses. 
English has an obligatory distinction between progressive and non-progressive aspect in the present and the past 
tenses (Comrie 1976, Dahl 1985). 
7 Swedish lacks grammatical categories to denote imperfective aspect (Dahl 1985). In order to express 
imperfectivity, lexical circumlocutions or body posture verbs may be used. These constructions do not, 
however, seem to occur with motion verbs (Bylund 2008, 2009). 
8 Greek has an obligatory distinction in the past between perfective and imperfective aspect (Dahl 1985). 
9The bias pervades to this day, in many instances of our collaboration. P.A. took the picture that is displayed in 
figure 1. When E.B. saw it, he immediately commented that the path is foregrounded too much, and the church 
(endpoint) isn’t as prominent as it should be.  
10 In fact, some iterations of the experiment manipulating working memory load yielded evidence for universal-
perceptual principles in event cognition. 
11 Specifically, this was done through a process of joint re-analysis whereby the controversial clips were 
discussed and the reasons for their different classifications weighed until consensus was reached. In cases where 
consensus could not be reached, clips were discarded, so as to rule out any remaining bias. 
